In the days and months following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., much discussion has occurred regarding the safeguarding of nuclear materials. In particular, questions have arisen as to what terrorists could accomplish if they were to get their hands on nuclear material.

One fear is that such material could be used to create a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb.” While the physical effects of such a device are downplayed by those within the nuclear industry (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Nils Diaz said in a July 2003 speech that a dirty bomb “will not result in a radiological hazard,” but rather “the primary impact is likely to be societal disruption and economical damage.”) safeguarding nuclear material remains a hot topic of conversation to this day.

To help in that safeguarding process, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations‘ atomic watchdog, began a field trial in April at an unnamed nuclear power plant in Slovakia that uses direct satellite feeds to allow IAEA inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear materials at the power plant.

Images are taken every five minutes, and electronic seal data on the wreactor core and the plant’s spent fuel pool are transmitted daily to the IAEA’s safeguards computer systems. Inspectors then can determine quickly if nuclear materials are being used for purposes outside of the normal operation of the plant.

“It provides agency inspectors with a continual flow of information,” Massimo Aparo of IAEA Safeguards Technical Support said in a report on the IAEA Web site. Prior to the installation of this satellite feed, inspectors needed to travel to the plant every three months to retrieve the needed data.

The use of remote monitoring is not a new concept to the IAEA. In the late 1990s, the organization began remote monitoring trials using telephone lines and the Internet to collect information.

“These telecommunications networks are not always reliable, especially when communicating with less developed countries that lack established telecommunications infrastructure,” Aparo said. He added that telephone lines are not an optimal transport mechanism for the large amounts of data that the IAEA uses.

With the ongoing trial seemingly successful, the IAEA is working with the European Space Agency to assess the feasibility and cost of using satellite technology to transmit information from more than 100 surveillance systems the IAEA operates in 13 countries. The results of that feasibility study are expected by the end of the year.

“The idea is to create a secure, global communications network between IAEA headquarters [in Vienna, Austria,] remote nuclear facilities and regional offices,” Aparo said.